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Abstract
The problem of (information-theoretic) X-secure T -private federated submodel learning
represents a setting where a large scale machine learning model is partitioned intoK submod-
els and stored across N distributed servers according to an X-secure threshold secret sharing
scheme. Various users wish to successively train (update) the submodel that is most relevant
to their local data while keeping the identity of their relevant submodel private from any set
of up to T colluding servers. Inspired by the idea of cross-subspace alignment (CSA) for X-
secure T -private information retrieval, we propose a novel CSA-RW (read-write) scheme for
efficiently (in terms of communication cost) and privately reading from and writing to a dis-
tributed database. CSA-RW is shown to be asymptotically/approximately optimal in down-
load/upload communication cost, and improves significantly upon available baselines from
prior work. It also answers in the affirmative an open question by Kairouz et al. by exploiting
synergistic gains from the joint design of private read and write operations.
1 Introduction
The rise of machine learning is marked by fundamental tradeoffs between competing concerns.
Central to this work are 1) the need for abundant training data, 2) the need for privacy, and 3)
the need for low communication cost. Federated learning [1–4] is a distributed machine learning
paradigm that addresses the first two concerns by allowing distributed users/clients (e.g., mobile
phones) to collaboratively train a shared model that is stored in a cluster of databases/servers
(cloud) while keeping their training data private. The users retrieve the current model, train the
model locally with their own training data, and then aggregate the modifications as focused up-
dates. Thus, federated learning allows utilization of abundant training data while preserving its
privacy. However, this incurs higher communication cost as each update involves communication
of all model parameters.
Communicating the full model may be unnecessary for large scale machine learning tasks
where each user’s local data is primarily relevant to a small part of the overall model, Federated
Submodel Learning (FSL) [5] builds on this observation by partitioning the model into multiple
submodels and allowing users to selectively train and update the submodels that are most rele-
vant to their local view. What makes this challenging is the privacy constraint. The identity of the
submodel that is being retrieved and updated by a user must remain private. Prior works [5–9]
that assume centralized storage of all submodels are generally able to provide relatively weaker
privacy guarantees such as plausible deniability through differential privacy mechanisms that
perturb the data and rely on secure inter-user peer-to-peer communication for secure aggregation.
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On the other hand, it is noted recently by Kim and Lee in [10] that if the servers that store the sub-
models are distributed, then stronger information theoretic guarantees such1 as ‘perfect privacy’
may be attainable, without the need for user-to-user communication. Indeed, in this work we fo-
cus on this setting of distributed servers and perfect privacy. The challenge of federated submodel
learning in this setting centers around three key questions.
Q1 Private Read: How can a user efficiently retrieve the desired submodel from the distributed
servers without revealing which submodel is being retrieved?
Q2 Private Write: How can a user efficiently update the desired submodel to the distributed
servers without revealing which submodel is being updated?
Q3 Synergy of Private Read-Write: Are there synergistic gains in the joint design of retrieval
and update operations, and if so, then how to exploit these synergies?
The significance of these fundamental questions goes well beyond federated submodel learning.
As recognized by [5] the private read question (Q1) by itself is equivalent to the problem of Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) [11,12], which has recently been studied extensively from an informa-
tion theoretic perspective [13–47]. Much less is known about Q2 and Q3, i.e., the fundamental
limits of private-write, and joint read-write solutions from the information theoretic perspective.
Notably, Q3 has also been highlighted previously as an open problem by Kairouz et al in [2]. The
problem of privately reading and writing data from a distributed memory falls under the larger
umbrella of Distributed Oblivious RAM (DORAM) [48] primitives in theoretical computer sci-
ence and cryptography. With a few limited exceptions (e.g., a specialized 4-server construction
in [49] that allows information theoretic privacy), prior studies of DORAM generally take a cryp-
tographic perspective, e.g., privacy is guaranteed subject to computational hardness assumptions,
and the number of memory blocks is assumed to be much larger than the size of each block. In
contrast, the focus of this work is on Q2 and Q3 under the stronger notion of information theoretic
privacy. Furthermore, because our motivation comes from federated submodel learning, the size
of a submodel is assumed to be significantly larger than the number of submodels (see motivating
examples in [5] and Observation 7 in Section 3.1).
Overview: We consider the federated submodel learning setting where the global model is
partitioned into K submodels, and stored among N distributed servers according to an X-secure
threshold secret sharing scheme, i.e., any set of up toX colluding servers can learn nothing about
the storedmodels, while the full model can be recovered from the data stored by anyX+1 servers.
One at a time, users update the submodel most relevant to their local training data. The updates
must be T -private, i.e., any set of up to T colluding servers must not learn anything about which
submodel is being updated. The contents of the updates must be X∆-secure, i.e., any set of up to
X∆ colluding servers must learn nothing about the contents of the submodel updates. The size
of a submodel is significantly larger than the number of submodels, which is significantly larger
than 1, i.e., L≫ K ≫ 1where L is the size of a submodel and K is the number of submodels.
Since the private-read problem (Q1) is essentially a form of PIR, our starting point is the
X-secure T -private information retrieval scheme (XSTPIR) of [28]. In particular, we build on
the idea of cross-subspace alignment (CSA) from [28], and introduce a new private read-write
scheme, called CSA-RW as an answer to Q1 and Q2. To our knowledge CSA-RW is the first
1By perfect privacy wemean that absolutely no information is leaked about the identity of a user’s desired submodel
to any set of colluding servers up to a target threshold.
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communication-efficient private federated submodel learning scheme that achieves information-
theoretically perfect privacy. CSA-RW also answers Q3 in the affirmative as it exploits query
structure from the private-read operation to reduce the communication cost for the private-write
operation. The evidence of synergistic gain in CSA-RW from a joint design of submodel retrieval
and submodel aggregation addresses the corresponding open problem highlighted in Section 4.4.4
of [2]. In terms of comparisons against available baselines, we note (see Observation 5 in Section
3.1) that CSA-RW improves significantly in both the communication efficiency and the level of
privacy compared to [10]. In fact, CSA-RW achieves the optimal download rate for large K when
X ≥ X∆ + T . Compared with the 4 server construction of information theoretic DORAM in [49],
(where X = 1, T = 1,X∆ = 0, N = 4) CSA-RW has better communication efficiency (the assump-
tion of L ≫ K is important in this regard). For example, as the ratio L/K approaches infinity,
CSA-RW achieves total communication cost (i.e., the summation of the download cost and the
upload cost, normalized by the submodel size) of 6, versus the communication cost of 8 achieved
by the construction in [49].
Notation: Bold symbols are used to denote vectors and matrices, while calligraphic sym-
bols denote sets. For a positive integer N , [N ] denotes the set {1, 2, · · · , N}. For a real num-
ber x, (x)+ denotes max(x, 0). For two tuples of the same length comprised of matrices, X =
(X1,X2, · · · ,XN ), Y = (Y1,Y2, · · · ,YN ), the entry-wise product is defined as
X ◦ Y
△
= (X1Y1,X2Y2, · · · ,XNYN ), the summation is defined as X + Y
△
= (X1 + Y1,X2 +
Y2, · · · ,XN +YN ). We also define the transpose of the tuple X
T = (XT1 ,X
T
2 , · · · ,X
T
N ). The no-
tation diag(D1,D2, · · · ,Dn) denotes the block diagonal matrix, i.e., the main-diagonal blocks are
square matrices (D1,D2, · · · ,Dn) and all off-diagonal blocks are zero matrices. For a positive in-
teger K , IK denotes the K × K identity matrix. For two positive integers k,K such that k ≤ K ,
eK(k) denotes the k
th column of the K ×K identity matrix. The notation O˜(a log2 b) suppresses2
polylog terms. It may be replaced with O(a log2 b) if the field supports the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT), and with O(a log2 b log log(b)) if it does not3.
2 Problem Statement: XSTPFSL
As shown in Figure 1, consider K (initial) submodels
(
W
(0)
1 ,W
(0)
2 , · · · ,W
(0)
K
)
, each of which
consists of L uniformly4 i.i.d. random symbols from a finite5 field Fq. Specifically, for k ∈ [K],
we have
W
(0)
k =
[
W
(0)
k (1),W
(0)
k (2), · · · ,W
(0)
k (L)
]T
, (1)
2There is another standard definition of the notation O˜ which fully suppresses polylog terms, i.e, O(apolylog(b))
is represented by O˜(a), regardless of the exact form of polylog(b). The definition used in this paper emphasizes the
dominant factor in the polylog term.
3If the FFT is not supported by the field, Scho¨nhage–Strassen algorithm [50] can be used for fast algorithms that
require convolutions, with an extra factor of log log b in the complexity.
4It is not necessary for the model dataW to be i.i.d. uniform for the proposed CSA-RW scheme. The proposed
CSA-RW scheme remains valid (correct, secure and private) even if the model data is arbitrarily distributed. The same
is true for model updates ∆t and the desired submodel indices θt. I.i.d. uniform assumptions on these entities are
needed only for converse arguments.
5The field size does not need to be too large, for example, according to Theorem 1 it is sufficient to have q ≥ 2N ,
whereN is the number of servers.
3
Server 1
S
(t−1)
1
Server 2
S
(t−1)
2
· · ·
Server N
S
(t−1)
N
User t
Q (t,θ
t)1
Q
(t,θt)
2
Q
(t,θt
)
N
A (t,θ
t)1
A
(t,θt)
n
A
(t,θt
)
N
W
(t−1)
θt
=
[
W
(t−1)
θt
(1),W
(t−1)
θt
(2), · · · ,W
(t−1)
θt
(L)
]T
(
θt,Z
(t)
U
)
(a) The retrieval (private read) phase of XSTPFSL.
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(b) The update (private write) phase of XSTPFSL.
Figure 1: The problem of X-Secure T -Private Federated Submodel Learning (XSTPFSL) consists of two
phases, namely, the retrieval phase illustrated in Figure 1a and the update phase illustrated in Figure 1b.
H
((
W
(0)
k
)
k∈[K]
)
= KL, (2)
in q-ary units. We associate submodel updates with users and time slots, so that the tth update
is made by User t at time slot t. For all t ∈ N, the storage at the nth server at time t is denoted
as S
(t)
n , where t = 0 corresponds to the initial storage. Similarly,
(
W
(t)
1 ,W
(t)
2 , · · · ,W
(t)
K
)
denotes
the submodels at time t. A full cycle of XSTPFSL consists of two parts — the retrieval (read)
phase and the update (write) phase. At the beginning of the retrieval phase, User t privately
generates uniformly distributed desired index θt and the user-side randomness Z
(t)
U , which is
needed to protect the user’s privacy. The user wishes to retrieve the submodelW
(t−1)
θt
without
revealing anything about (θ1, θ2, · · · , θt) to any set of up to T colluding servers. To this end, the
user generates N read-queries
(
Q
(t,θt)
1 , Q
(t,θt)
2 , · · · , Q
(t,θt)
N
)
, where Q
(t,θt)
n is intended for the nth
server, such that,
H
(
Q(t,θt)n | θt,Z
(t)
U
)
= 0, ∀n ∈ [N ]. (3)
4
Upon receiving the query, each of the N servers responds to the user with an answer A
(t,θt)
n ,
such that,
H
(
A(t,θt)n | S
(t−1)
n , Q
(t,θt)
n
)
= 0, ∀n ∈ [N ]. (4)
The user must be able to recover the desired submodelW
(t−1)
θt
after collecting the answers from
all N servers.
[Correctness] H
(
W
(t−1)
θt
∣∣∣∣ (A(t,θt)n )n∈[N ] ,(Q(t,θt)n )n∈[N ] , θt
)
= 0.
This completes the retrieval phase.
At the beginning of the update phase, User t generates privately an increment for the θtht sub-
model, ∆t = [∆t(1),∆t(2), · · · ,∆t(L)]
T, which is comprised of L i.i.d. uniformly distributed
symbols from the finite field Fq, i.e., H(∆t) = L, in q-ary units. User t wishes to update the
submodel W
(t−1)
θt
with the increment ∆t, such that User t + 1 is able to retrieve the submodel
W
(t)
θt
= W
(t−1)
θt
+ ∆t if θt+1 = θt, and the submodelW
(t)
θ′t
= W
(t−1)
θ′t
if θt+1 = θ
′
t 6= θt. To this
end, User t generates N write-queries
(
P
(t,θt)
1 , P
(t,θt)
2 , · · · , P
(t,θt)
N
)
for the N servers, where P
(t,θt)
n
is intended for the nth server. As before, any T colluding servers must learn nothing about the
desired index θt, and ∀n ∈ [N ],
H
(
P (t,θt)n | θt,Z
(t)
U ,
(
A(t,θt)n
)
n∈[N ]
,∆t
)
= 0. (5)
Upon receiving the query, each of the servers updates its storage according to its current storage
S
(t−1)
n and the queries
(
P
(t,θt)
n , Q
(t,θt)
n
)
so that ∀n ∈ [N ], t ∈ Z+,
H
(
S(t)n | S
(t−1)
n , P
(t,θt)
n , Q
(t,θt)
n
)
= 0. (6)
To correctly reflect such modification to the θtht submodel, for all t ∈ Z
+, k ∈ [K], we defineW
(t)
k
recursively as follows.
W
(t)
k =
{
W
(t−1)
k +∆t k = θt,
W
(t−1)
k k 6= θt.
(7)
Next we formalize the security and privacy constraints. T -privacy guarantees that at any time,
any set of up to T colluding servers learn nothing about the indices (θ1, θ2, · · · , θt).
[T -Privacy] I
(
(θτ )τ∈[t];
(
P (t,θt)n , Q
(t,θt)
n
)
n∈T
∣∣∣∣(S(τ−1)n , P (τ−1,θτ−1)n , Q(τ−1,θτ−1)n )τ∈[t],n∈T
)
= 0,
∀T ∈ [N ], |T | = T, t ∈ Z+, (8)
where for all n ∈ [N ], we defineP
(0,θ0)
n = Q
(0,θ0)
n = ∅. TheX-secure constraint,X ≥ T , is that theN
servers store the submodels according to an X-secure threshold secret sharing scheme, i.e., at any
time, any set of up to X colluding servers know nothing about the submodels, but all submodels
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must be recoverable from the storage of any (X +1) servers. To this end, storage randomness ZS ,
which is independent of the submodels, is generated to form the initial X-secure storage.
H
(
S(0)n |
(
W
(0)
k
)
k∈[K]
,ZS
)
= 0,∀n ∈ [N ], (9)
[X-Security] I
((
W
(t−1)
k
)
k∈[K]
;
(
S(t−1)n
)
n∈X
∣∣∣∣(S(τ−2)n , P (τ−1,θτ−1)n , Q(τ−1,θτ−1)n )τ∈[t],n∈X
)
= 0,
∀X ⊂ [N ], |X | = X, t ∈ Z+, (10)
[Recoverability] H
((
W
(t)
k
)
k∈[K]
∣∣∣(S(t)n )
n∈X ′
)
= 0,∀X ′ ⊂ [N ], |X ′| = X + 1, t ∈ N, (11)
where for all n ∈ [N ], let us define S−1n = ∅. Similarly, to guarantee that any set of up to X∆
colluding servers reveal nothing about the increment ∆t, the X∆-security constraint, X∆ ≥ 0, is
formalized as follows.
[X∆-Security] I
(
∆t;
(
P (t,θt)n
)
n∈X
∣∣∣∣(S(τ−1)n , P (τ−1,θτ−1)n , Q(τ,θτ )n )τ∈[t],n∈X
)
= 0,
∀X ⊂ [N ], |X | = X∆, t ∈ Z
+. (12)
The independence of noise, increments, desired indices and submodels is specified so that for
all t ∈ Z+, we have
H
((
W
(0)
k
)
k∈[K]
, (∆τ )τ∈[t] , (θτ )τ∈[t] ,
(
Z
(τ)
U
)
τ∈[t]
,ZS
)
= H
((
W
(0)
k
)
k∈[K]
)
+
∑
τ∈[t]
H(∆τ ) +
∑
τ∈[t]
H(θτ ) +
∑
τ∈[t]
H(Z
(τ)
U ) +H(ZS). (13)
Our focus is on the communication cost of XSTPFSL. For t ∈ Z+, the download cost Dt is the
expected (over all realizations of queries) number of q-ary symbols downloaded by User t, nor-
malized by L. The upload cost Ut is the expected number of q-ary symbols uploaded by User t,
also normalized by L. If the scheme is time-invariant, i.e., the download cost and the upload cost
is independent of t, we use shorthand notations (U,D) instead of (Ut,Dt). The asymptotic capacity
of XSTPFSL, denoted as C∞, is the supremum of reciprocal of achievable download costs
6 over
t ∈ Z+ of all XSTPFSL schemes, in the limit as the number of submodelsK →∞.
3 Main Results
The main contribution of this work is the CSA-RW scheme, whose performance is specified in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let ℓ = N − (X + T ), q ≥ ℓ + N . When X∆ + T ≤ X ≤ N − T − 1, for an arbitrary
positive integer µ such that L = µℓ, the following (upload, download) cost pair (U,D) is achievable by the
CSA-RW scheme.
(U,D) =
(
(N −X +X∆ + T ) +
NℓK
L
,
N
ℓ
)
. (14)
6The reason for focusing on the download cost is in part that by our achievability scheme, with high levels of security
and privacy, i.e., when values ofX and T are close to the number of serversN , the download cost dominates the upload
cost, see Theorem 1. Indeed, high levels of security and privacy are desirable for XSTPFSL.
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The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Section 4. Note that Theorem 1 is not limited to asymp-
totic settings. However, in the limit as L/K →∞, we have
(U,D)
L/K→∞
=
(
N −X +X∆ + T,
N
N − (X + T )
)
. (15)
The following corollary underscores the download optimality of CSA-RW in terms of the
asymptotic (large K) capacity.
Corollary 1. When X ≥ X∆ + T , the asymptotic capacity is
C∞ =
(
1−
X + T
N
)+
. (16)
Corollary 1 follows directly from the asymptotic capacity results of XSTPIR [28], because the
retrieval phase of XSTPFSL is equivalent to XSTPIR. Note that we must have X ≥ T , because
any X + 1 colluding servers reveal everything about the submodels, hence they can figure out
the desired indices θt, t ∈ Z
+ by monitoring which submodels are modified. Therefore, when
X∆ = 0, the asymptotic capacity of XSTPFSL is fully settled. We conjecture that in general, the
conditionX ≥ X∆ + T is required for the feasibility (bounded communication cost as K →∞) of
the asymptotic setting.
3.1 Observations
1. The upload cost achieved by CSA-RW is bounded (O(1)), according to Theorem 1, which is
order-wise optimal.
2. Theorem 1 contains a trade-off between the level of data security X, the upload cost U and
the download cost D in the CSA-RW scheme. In particular, it is possible to achieve stricter
data security levels and lower upload cost simultaneously, at the cost of increased download
cost. To see this tradeoff explicitly, let us consider the example where N = 10,X∆ = T =
1. For various choices of X ∈ {2, 3, · · · , 8}, we plot the achievable upload costs versus
download costs in Figure 2.
3. An interesting aspect of the CSA-RW scheme (which answers in the affirmative an open
question raised in Section 4.4.4 of [2]) is the synergistic exploitation of the structure of the
same query vector across both the retrieval phase and the update phase. Intuitively, consider
the vectorW = [W1,W2, · · · ,WK ]
T that consists of symbols from theK submodels. Also, let
us consider the standard basis vector eK(θt) for some θt ∈ [K]. Note that the symbol of the
θtht submodel is retrievable from the inner productW
TeK(θt) = Wθt . This is the key to the
reading operation. On the other hand, to perform a write, we note the following equation
W + ∆teK(θt) = [W1, · · · ,Wθt−1,Wθt + ∆t,Wθt+1 · · · ,WK ]. Therefore, intuitively we see
how the same secret-shared query vector eK(θt) is useful for both the retrieval phase and
the update phase. Note that this requires the construction of the scheme to be compatible
with both the inner product and the operations of the vector space over the finite field Fq.
Consequently, the idea of CSA turns out to be the communication-efficient solution.
4. Another interesting aspect of CSA-RW is that when the data security level (X) is greater than
X∆ + T , it is possible to achieve the upload cost of less than N in the asymptotic setting, as
7
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Figure 2: Achievable (upload, download) costs pairs (U,D) for the proposed CSA-RW scheme as both
K →∞ and L/K →∞ for N = 10,X∆ = T = 1, with various choices of X ∈ {2, 3, · · · , 8}.
stated in Theorem 1. This is made possible by the construction of CSA null-shaper, see
Definition 4. By carefully placing nulls of the CSA code polynomial in the update equation,
the storage of a total of X − (X∆ + T ) servers is left unmodified. At the same time, the
storage structure (i.e., CSA storage, see Definition 1) is preserved, and the functionality of
the retrieval phase is not affected. Hence, the users do not upload the increments to those
servers, and the upload cost is improved. Now let us further clarify the idea with a minimal
example where X = 2, T = 1,X∆ = 0, N = 4. Continuing from the previous observation,
let us define the following functions.
S(α) =W+ αZ1 + α
2Z2, (17)
Q(α) = eK(θt) + αZ
′, (18)
where Z1,Z2,Z
′ are uniformly and independently distributed noise vectors that are used
to protect data security and user’s privacy, respectively. Let α1, α2, α3, α4 be 4 distinct non-
zero elements from a finite field Fq. The storage at the 4 servers is S(α1), S(α2), S(α3), S(α4),
respectively. Similarly, the query for the 4 servers isQ(α1), Q(α2), Q(α3), Q(α4), respectively.
We note that the storage and the query can be viewed as secret sharing with threshold of
X = 2 and T = 1, respectively. Now it is easy to see that by the following update equation,
S′(α) = S(α) + ∆tQ(α) (19)
= (W+∆tek(θt)) + α(Z1 +∆tZ
′) + α2Z2, (20)
the user is able to update the symbol of the θtht message with the increment∆t. And we note
that after updating, the storage remains a secret sharing of thresholdX = 2. However, let us
define the function Ω(α) = (α1−α)/α1, which is referred to as CSA null-shaper, and consider
the following update equation.
S′(α) = S(α) + Ω(α)∆tQ(α). (21)
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Now let us inspect the second term on the RHS. Note that
Ω(α)∆tQ(α) =
1
α1
(α1 − α)∆t(eK(θt) + αZ
′) (22)
=
1
α1
∆t
(
α1eK(θt) + α(α1Z
′ − eK(θt))− α
2Z′
)
(23)
= ∆t
(
eK(θt) + α(Z
′ − α−11 eK(θt))− α
2α−11 Z
′
)
, (24)
= ∆t
(
eK(θt) + αI1 − α
2I2
)
, (25)
where I1 = Z
′ − α−11 eK(θt) and I2 = α
−1
1 Z
′. It is obvious that by the new update equa-
tion, the user is able to update the symbol of the θtht message with the increment ∆t, while
maintaining the storage as a secret sharing of threshold 2, i.e.,
S′(α) = (W+∆tek(θt)) + α(Z1 +∆tI1) + α
2(Z2 +∆tI2). (26)
However, by the definition of CSA null-shaper, we have Ω(α1) = 0. Thus S
′(α1) = S(α1),
and it is not necessary to upload the increment ∆t to Server 1. In other words, I1 and I2
are artificially correlated interference symbols such that the codeword Ω(α1)Q(α1) is zero, and
accordingly, the upload cost is improved. Note that CSA null-shaper does not affect the
storage structure because X = 2 > T = 1. The idea illustrated in this minimal example is
generalizable for the framework of CSA, see Section 4 for details.
5. Let us compare our CSA-RW solution with that in [10]. The setting considered in [10] is a
special case of our problem where X = 0, T = 1,X∆ = 0, and the recoverability constraint
is relaxed. To make the comparison more concrete, let us briefly review the construction
in [10]. At any time t, t ∈ N, each of the N servers stores the K submodels in the following
coded form.
W
(t−1)
k + z
(t)
k ∆t,∀k ∈ [K], (27)
where for all t ∈ Z+,
(
z
(t)
k
)
k∈[K]
are distinct random scalars generated by User t and we
set z
(t)
θt
= 1. For completeness we define ∆0 = 0, z
(0)
k = 0,W
(−1)
k = W
(0)
k ,∀k ∈ [K]. In
addition, the N servers store the random scalars
(
z
(t)
k
)
k∈[K]
, as well as the increment ∆t
according to a secret sharing scheme of threshold 1. In the retrieval phase, User t retrieves
the coded desired submodelW
(t−2)
θt
+z
(t−1)
θt
∆t−1 privately according to a capacity-achieving
replicated storage based PIR scheme, e.g., [12]. Besides, User t also downloads the secret
shared random scalars
(
z
(t−1)
k
)
k∈[K]
and the increment∆t−1 to correctly recover the desired
submodelW
(t−1)
θt
. In the update phase, User t uploads to each of theN servers the following
update vectors P
(t)
k for all k ∈ [K].
P
(t)
k =
{
z
(t)
k ∆t − z
(t−1)
k ∆t−1, k 6= θt−1,
z
(t)
k ∆t, k = θt−1.
(28)
Also, User t uploads the secret shared random scalars
(
z
(t)
k
)
k∈[K]
and the increment ∆t to
the N servers. To perform an update, each of the N servers updates all of the submodels
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k ∈ [K] according to the following equation.(
W
(t−2)
k + z
(t−1)
k ∆t−1
)
+P
(t)
k =W
(t−1)
k + z
(t)
k ∆t. (29)
Perhaps the most significant difference between our CSA-RW scheme and the construction
in [10] is that the latter does not guarantee the privacy of successive updates, i.e., by mon-
itoring the storage at multiple time slots, the servers are eventually able to learn about the
submodel indices from past updates7. On the other hand, our construction guarantees in-
formation theoretic privacy for an unlimited number of updates, without extra storage over-
head. Furthermore,we note that the normalized download cost achieved by the construction
in [10] cannot be less than 2, whereas CSA-RW achieves download cost of less than 2 with
large enough N . For the asymptotic setting L/K → ∞, the upload cost8 achieved by [10] is
at least 2N + 1, while CSA-RW achieves the upload cost of at most N . The lower bound of
upload cost of XSTPFSL where X = 0, T = 1,X∆ = 0 is characterized in [10] as NK . How-
ever, our construction of CSA-RW presents a contradiction that calls into question9 the lower
bound of upload cost in [10]. In particular, for the asymptotic setting K → ∞, L/K → ∞,
the upload cost of less than N is achievable by the CSA-RW scheme.
6. Let us also briefly review the 4-server information-theoretic DORAM construction in [49] to
see how our CSA-RW scheme improves upon it. Note that the setting considered in [49]
is a special case of our problem where X = 1, T = 1,X∆ = 0, and the recoverability con-
straint is also relaxed. First, we note that in the asymptotic setting L/K → ∞, the upload
cost achieved by the CSA-RW is the same as that in [49]. Therefore, for this comparison we
focus on the retrieval phase and the download cost. Specifically, the information-theoretic
DORAM construction in [49] partitions the four servers into two groups, each of which con-
sists of 2 servers. For the retrieval phase, the first group emulates a 2-server PIR, storing
the K submodels secured with additive random noise, i.e.,W + Z. The second group em-
ulates another 2-server PIR storing the random noise Z. To retrieve the desired submodel
privately, the user exploits a PIR scheme to retrieve the desired secured submodel, as well
as the corresponding random noise. Therefore, with capacity-achieving PIR schemes, the
download cost is 4 (for large K). On the other hand, our CSA-RW scheme avoids the par-
titioning of the servers and improves the download cost by jointly exploiting all 4 servers.
Remarkably, with the idea of cross-subspace alignment, out of the 4 downloaded symbols,
the interference symbols align within 2 dimensions, leaving 2 dimensions interference-free
for the desired symbols, and consequently, the asymptotically optimal download cost of 2 is
achievable. Lastly, the CSA-RW scheme also generalizes efficiently to arbitrary numbers of
servers.
7This is because the update vectors (28) for the K submodels at any time t can be viewed as Pt = span{∆t,∆t−1}.
For any two consecutive time slots t and t + 1, it is possible to determine span{∆t} = span{∆t,∆t−1} ∩
span{∆t+1,∆t} = Pt ∩ Pt+1. Due to the fact that for User t, the update vector for the θ
th
t−1 submodel (6) only lies
in span{∆t}, any curious server is able to obtain information about θt−1 fromPt if∆t is linearly independent of∆t−1.
8It is claimed in [10] that the achieved upload cost is NLK + L + K. However, with compression, e.g., entropy
encoding, it is possible to achieve lower upload cost. For example, in the asymptotic setting L/K → ∞, the upload
cost of (2N + 1 + 1/(N − 1))may be achievable.
9It is argued in [10] that for the desired submodel, the user uploads L symbols for the update, while for other
submodels, the user should also upload (K − 1)L symbols to guarantee the privacy. However, it turns out that the
uploaded symbols for the update of the desired submodel and the symbols for the purpose of guaranteeing the privacy
do not have to be independent.
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7. Finally, let us explore the practical significance of the asymptotic limits K →∞, L/K →∞,
with an example. Suppose we have N = 6 distributed servers, we require security and
privacy levels of X∆ = T = 1,X = 3, so that ℓ = 2, and we operate over F8. Consider an
e-commerce recommendation application similar to what is studied in [5], where a global
model with a total of 3, 500, 000 symbols (from F8) is partitioned into K = 50 submodels.
Each of the submodels is comprised of L = 70, 000 symbols. Note that L ≫ K ≫ 1. Now
according to Theorem 1, the normalized upload cost achieved by the CSA-RW scheme is
U = (6 − 3 + 1 + 1) + 6×2×5070,000 ≈ 5.00857. On the other hand, the normalized download
cost achieved is D = 6/2 = 3. Evidently, the asymptotic limits K → ∞, L/K → ∞ are
fairly accurate for this non-asymptotic setting. For this particular example, the upload cost is
increased by only 0.17% compared to the asymptotic limit. On the other hand, the download
cost is increased by only 1.4× 10−22% compared to the lower bound (evaluated forK = 50)
from [28].
4 Proof of Theorem 1
Let X∆ + T ≤ X ≤ N − T − 1. Set ℓ = N − (X + T ), L = µℓ. We need a total of (ℓ + N) dis-
tinct constants from the finite field Fq, q ≥ ℓ+N , denoted as (f1, f2, · · · , fℓ) and (α1, α2, · · · , αN ).
Furthermore, (α1, α2, · · · , αN ) are non-zero elements. ∀k ∈ [K], t ∈ N, u ∈ [µ], l ∈ [ℓ], define
W
(t)
k (u, l) = W
(t)
k (ℓ(u− 1) + l), (30)
i.e., the L = µℓ symbols of each of the K submodels are partitioned into µ groups, each of which
consists of ℓ symbols. Similarly, for the increments, we define
∆t(u, l) = ∆t(ℓ(u− 1) + l). (31)
For all t ∈ N, u ∈ [µ], l ∈ [ℓ], let us define,
W˙
(t)
u,l =
[
W
(t)
1 (u, l),W
(t)
2 (u, l), · · · ,W
(t)
K (u, l)
]T
. (32)
Further, let us set Zs =
{
Z˙
(0,x)
u,l
}
u∈[µ],l∈[ℓ],x∈[X]
, where Z˙
(0,x)
u,l are i.i.d. uniform column vectors
from FKq , ∀u ∈ [µ], l ∈ [ℓ], x ∈ [X]. For all t ∈ Z
+, we also set Z
(t)
U =
{
Z¨
(t,s)
l
}
l∈[ℓ],s∈[T ]
∪{...
Z
(t,x)
u,l
}
u∈[µ],l∈[ℓ],x∈[X∆]
, where for all t ∈ Z+, l ∈ [ℓ], s ∈ [T ], Z¨
(t,s)
l are i.i.d. uniform column
vectors from FKq , and for all t ∈ Z
+, u ∈ [µ], l ∈ [ℓ], x ∈ [X∆],
...
Z
(t,x)
u,l are i.i.d. uniform scalars from
Fq. Furthermore, for all t ∈ Z
+, u ∈ [µ], l ∈ [ℓ], x ∈ [X], let Z˙
(t,x)
u,l be K × 1 column vectors from the
finite field Fq. Let us start from the following definitions.
Definition 1. (CSA Storage) For any t ∈ N, the storage at the N servers is said to form the CSA storage
if for all n ∈ [N ], S
(t)
n have the following form.
S(t)n =
(
S
(t)
n,1,S
(t)
n,2, · · · ,S
(t)
n,µ
)
, (33)
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where for all u ∈ [µ]
S(t)n,u =

1
f1−αn
W˙
(t)
u,1 +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t,x)
u,1
1
f2−αn
W˙
(t)
u,2 +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t,x)
u,2
...
1
fℓ−αn
W˙
(t)
u,ℓ +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t,x)
u,ℓ
 . (34)
Definition 2. (CSA Query) For any t ∈ Z+, the retrieve-queries
(
Q
(t,θt)
n
)
n∈[N ]
from User t for the N
servers are said to form a CSA query if for all n ∈ [N ], we have
Q(t,θt)n =
(
Q
(t,θt)
n,1 ,Q
(t,θt)
n,2 , · · · ,Q
(t,θt)
n,µ
)
, (35)
where for all n ∈ [N ],
Q
(t,θt)
n,1 = · · · = Q
(t,θt)
n,µ =

eK(θt) + (f1 − αn)
∑
s∈[T ] α
s−1
n Z¨
(t,s)
1
eK(θt) + (f2 − αn)
∑
s∈[T ] α
s−1
n Z¨
(t,s)
2
...
eK(θt) + (fℓ − αn)
∑
s∈[T ] α
s−1
n Z¨
(t,s)
ℓ
 . (36)
Definition 3. (CSA Increment) For any t ∈ Z+, the write-queries
(
P
(t,θt)
n
)
n∈[N ]
from User t for the N
servers are said to form a CSA increment if for all n ∈ [N ], we have
P (t,θt)n =
(
P
(t,θt)
n,1 ,P
(t,θt)
n,2 , · · · ,P
(t,θt)
n,µ
)
, (37)
where for all n ∈ [N ], u ∈ [µ],
P(t,θt)n,u = diag
 1
f1 − αn
∆t(u, 1) +
∑
x∈[X∆]
αx−1n
...
Z
(t,x)
u,1
 IK , · · ·
· · · ,
 1
fℓ − αn
∆t(u, ℓ) +
∑
x∈[X∆]
αx−1n
...
Z
(t,x)
u,ℓ
 IK
 . (38)
Definition 4. (CSA Null-shaper) Define the set F = [X − (X∆ + T )]. The CSA null-shaper is defined as
follows.
Ωn = (Ωn,1,Ωn,2, · · · ,Ωn,µ) , (39)
where for all n ∈ [N ], u ∈ [µ],
Ωn,1 = · · · = Ωn,µ = diag
((∏
f∈F (αf − αn)∏
f∈F (αf − f1)
)
IK , · · · ,
(∏
f∈F (αf − αn)∏
f∈F (αf − fℓ)
)
IK
)
. (40)
Note that the CSA null-shaper is a constant, and most importantly, for all n ∈ F , u ∈ [µ], we have
Ωn,u = 0.
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Definition 5. (CSA-RW Scheme) The initial storage at the N servers is the CSA storage at time 0, i.e.,(
S
(0)
n
)
n∈[N ]
. At time t, t ∈ Z+, in the retrieval phase, the user uploads the CSA query for theN servers and
retrieves the desired submodelW
(t−1)
θt
from the answers returned by the N servers, which are constructed
as follows.
A(t,θt)n =
(
S(t−1)n
)
T
◦Q(t,θt)n , n ∈ [N ]. (41)
In the update phase, the user uploads the CSA increment for the N servers and each of the servers updates
its storage according to the following equation.
S(t)n = S
(t−1)
n +Ωn ◦ P
(t,θt)
n ◦Q
(t,θt)
n , n ∈ [N ]. (42)
Now let us prove the correctness of the presented construction. We start from the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1. The CSA-RW scheme allows User t to retrieve the desired submodelW
(t−1)
θt
while satisfying
the T -privacy constraint.
Proof. By definition, for all n ∈ [N ], we have
A(t,θt)n =
((
S(t−1)n,u
)
T
Q(t,θt)n,u
)
u∈[µ]
. (43)
For all u ∈ [µ], we have(
S(t−1)n,u
)T
Q(t,θt)n,u
=
∑
l∈[ℓ]
 1
fl − αn
W˙
(t−1)
u,l +
∑
x∈[X]
αx−1n Z˙
(t−1,x)
u,l
eK(θt) + (fl − αn) ∑
s∈[T ]
αs−1n Z¨
(t,s)
l
 (44)
=
∑
l∈[ℓ]
 1
fl − αn
W˙
(t−1)
u,l eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X+T ]
αi−1n I
(t)
u,l,i
 (45)
=
∑
l∈[ℓ]
(
1
fl − αn
W
(t−1)
θt
(u, l)
)
+
∑
i∈[X+T ]
αi−1n I
(t)
u,i, (46)
where for all l ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ [X + T ], I
(t)
u,l,i are various linear combinations of inner products of W˙
(t−1)
u,l ,
eK(θt),
(
Z˙
(t−1,x)
u,l
)
x∈[X]
and
(
Z¨
(t,s)
l
)
s∈[T ]
, whose exact forms are irrelevant, and I
(t)
u,i =
∑
l∈[ℓ] I
(t)
u,l,i.
Therefore, in the matrix form, we have

(
S
(t−1)
1,u
)T
Q
(t,θt)
1,u(
S
(t−1)
2,u
)
T
Q
(t,θt)
2,u
...(
S
(t−1)
N,u
)
T
Q
(t,θt)
N,u

=

1
f1−α1
· · · 1fℓ−α1 1 · · · α
X+T−1
1
1
f1−α2
· · · 1fℓ−α2 1 · · · α
X+T−1
2
...
...
...
...
...
...
1
f1−αN
· · · 1fℓ−αN 1 · · · α
X+T−1
N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C

W
(t−1)
θt
(u, 1)
...
W
(t−1)
θt
(u, ℓ)
I
(t)
u,1
...
I
(t)
u,X+T

, (47)
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whereC is anN ×N Cauchy-Vandermonde matrix, which is invertible, see, e.g., [51]. Thus for all
u ∈ [µ], the user is able to retrieve the desired symbols
(
W
(t−1)
θt
(u, l)
)
l∈[ℓ]
by inverting the matrix.
Therefore, the desired submodel W
(t−1)
θt
is retrieved. To verify the T -privacy, we note that by
the construction of the query, the vector eK(θt), which carries the information of desired index θ,
is protected by the MDS(N,T ) coded uniform i.i.d. random noise vectors. Thus the queries for
the N servers form a secret sharing of threshold T , and are independent of the queries and the
increments of all prior users τ, τ ∈ [t− 1]. Thus T -privacy is guaranteed.
Lemma 2. The CSA-RW scheme correctly updates the desired submodel and achieves CSA storage at each
timeslot t while guaranteeing T -privacy andX∆-security.
Proof. Let us first inspect the second term on the RHS of (42). For all n ∈ [N ], we have
Ωn ◦ P
(t,θt)
n ◦Q
(t,θt)
n =
(
Ωn,uP
(t,θt)
n,u Q
(t,θt)
n,u
)
u∈[µ]
, (48)
where for all u ∈ [µ], we have
Ωn,uP
(t,θt)
n,u Q
(t,θt)
n,u
=

∏
f∈F(αf−αn)∏
f∈F (αf−f1)
(
1
f1−αn
∆t(u, 1) +
∑
x∈[X∆]
αx−1n
...
Z
(t,x)
u,1
)(
eK(θt) + (f1 − αn)
∑
s∈[T ] α
s−1
n Z¨
(t,s)
1
)
∏
f∈F(αf−αn)∏
f∈F (αf−f2)
(
1
f2−αn
∆t(u, 2) +
∑
x∈[X∆]
αx−1n
...
Z
(t,x)
u,2
)(
eK(θt) + (f2 − αn)
∑
s∈[T ] α
s−1
n Z¨
(t,s)
2
)
...
∏
f∈F(αf−αn)∏
f∈F(αf−fℓ)
(
1
fℓ−αn
∆t(u, ℓ) +
∑
x∈[X∆]
αx−1n
...
Z
(t,x)
u,ℓ
)(
eK(θt) + (fℓ − αn)
∑
s∈[T ] α
s−1
n Z¨
(t,s)
ℓ
)

(49)
=

∏
f∈F(αf−αn)∏
f∈F (αf−f1)
(
1
f1−αn
∆t(u, 1)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X∆+T ]
αi−1n I˙
(t)
u,1,i
)
∏
f∈F(αf−αn)∏
f∈F (αf−f2)
(
1
f2−αn
∆t(u, 2)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X∆+T ]
αi−1n I˙
(t)
u,2,i
)
...
∏
f∈F(αf−αn)∏
f∈F(αf−fℓ)
(
1
fℓ−αn
∆t(u, ℓ)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X∆+T ]
αi−1n I˙
(t)
u,ℓ,i
)
 (50)
=

1∏
f∈F(αf−f1)
(∏
f∈F (αf−f1)
f1−αn
∆t(u, 1)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X] α
i−1
n I¨
(t)
u,1,i
)
1∏
f∈F(αf−f2)
(∏
f∈F (αf−f2)
f2−αn
∆t(u, 2)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X] α
i−1
n I¨
(t)
u,2,i
)
...
1∏
f∈F (αf−fℓ)
(∏
f∈F (αf−fℓ)
fℓ−αn
∆t(u, ℓ)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X] α
i−1
n I¨
(t)
u,ℓ,i
)
 (51)
=

1
f1−αn
∆t(u, 1)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X] α
i−1
n
...
I
(t)
u,1,i
1
f2−αn
∆t(u, 2)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X] α
i−1
n
...
I
(t)
u,2,i
...
1
fℓ−αn
∆t(u, ℓ)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X] α
i−1
n
...
I
(t)
u,ℓ,i
 . (52)
For all l ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ [X], I˙
(t)
u,ℓ,i, I¨
(t)
u,ℓ,i and
...
I
(t)
u,ℓ,i are various linear combinations of the vectors eK(θt)
and
(
Z¨
(t,s)
l
)
s∈[T ]
, whose exact forms are not relevant. Note that in (50), we multiply the last two
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terms of each row. In (51), we multiply the numerator polynomial (with respect to αn) of the first
term in each row with the second term. Note that for all l ∈ [ℓ],
∏
f∈F (αf − fl) is the remainder of
the polynomial division
(∏
f∈F (αf − αn)
)
/(fl − αn), and they are non-zero due to the fact that
(f1, f2, · · · , fℓ), (α1, α2, · · · , αN ) are distinct. Now by the definition of the update equation in (42),
we have
S(t)n = S
(t−1)
n + P
(t,θt)
n ◦Q
(t,θt)
n (53)
=
(
S
(t−1)
n,1 , · · · ,S
(t−1)
n,µ
)
+
(
Ωn,1P
(t,θt)
n,1 Q
(t,θt)
n,1 , · · · ,Ωn,µP
(t,θt)
n,µ Q
(t,θt)
n,µ
)
(54)
=
(
S
(t−1)
n,1 +Ωn,1P
(t,θt)
n,1 Q
(t,θt)
n,1 , · · · ,S
(t−1)
n,µ +Ωn,µP
(t,θt)
n,µ Q
(t,θt)
n,µ
)
(55)
We note that for all u ∈ [µ], we have
S(t−1)n,u +Ωn,uP
(t,θt)
n,u Q
(t,θt)
n,u
=

1
f1−αn
W˙
(t−1)
u,1 +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t−1,x)
u,1
1
f2−αn
W˙
(t−1)
u,2 +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t−1,x)
u,2
...
1
fℓ−αn
W˙
(t−1)
u,ℓ +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t−1,x)
u,ℓ
+

1
f1−αn
∆t(u, 1)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X] α
i−1
n
...
I
(t)
u,1,i
1
f2−αn
∆t(u, 2)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X] α
i−1
n
...
I
(t)
u,2,i
...
1
fℓ−αn
∆t(u, ℓ)eK(θt) +
∑
i∈[X] α
i−1
n
...
I
(t)
u,ℓ,i
 (56)
=

1
f1−αn
(W˙
(t−1)
u,1 +∆t(u, 1)eK(θt)) +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t,x)
u,1
1
f2−αn
(W˙
(t−1)
u,2 +∆t(u, 2)eK(θt)) +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t,x)
u,2
...
1
fℓ−αn
(W˙
(t−1)
u,ℓ +∆t(u, ℓ)eK(θt)) +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t,x)
u,ℓ
 (57)
=

1
f1−αn
W˙
(t)
u,1 +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t,x)
u,1
1
f2−αn
W˙
(t)
u,2 +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t,x)
u,2
...
1
fℓ−αn
W˙
(t)
u,ℓ +
∑
x∈[X] α
x−1
n Z˙
(t,x)
u,ℓ
 , (58)
where (58) holds from the definitions of
(
W
(t)
k
)
k∈[K]
and
(
W˙
(t)
u,l
)
u∈[µ],l∈[ℓ]
. Note that for all l ∈
[ℓ], x ∈ [X], Z˙
(t,x)
u,l = Z˙
(t−1,x)
u,l +
...
I
(t)
u,l,x. The form shown in (58) is exactly the form defined by
CSA storage. T -privacy is proved by Lemma 1. Besides, it is easy to see that the symbols of
the increment vector ∆t are protected by the MDS(N,X∆) coded uniform i.i.d. random noise
symbols, i.e., the CSA increment forms a secret sharing of thresholdX∆, and it is independent of
the increments by the users τ, τ ∈ [t− 1] and the queries by the users τ, τ ∈ [t]. Thus X∆-security
is guaranteed. This completes the proof of Lemma 2
Based on Lemma 1, Lemma 2which hold for all t, the CSA-RW scheme satisfies the correctness,
T -privacy, and X∆-security constraints for each update t, t ∈ Z
+. Now let us consider the X-
security. By the definition of CSA storage at time 0, i.e., the initial storage
(
S
(0)
n
)
n∈[N ]
, it forms a
secret sharing of thresholdX. For any t, t ∈ Z+, the queries and the increments
(
P
(t,θt)
n , Q
(t,θt)
n
)
of
the users τ, τ ∈ [t] are independent of the initial storage. Thus X-security is guaranteed. Besides
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we note that CSA storage at any time t,
(
S
(t)
n
)
n∈[N ]
, can be viewed as an MDS(N,X + 1) code of(
W˙
(t)
u,l
)
u∈[µ],l∈[ℓ]
and
(
Z˙
(t,x)
u,l
)
u∈[µ],l∈[ℓ],x∈[X]
, thus we can recover all of the K submodels from the
storage of any (X + 1) servers.
Finally, let us calculate the upload and download costs. Note that the costs are time-invariant,
so we use the compact notations (U,D). In terms of the upload cost U , by the definition of CSA
query, a total of NℓK symbols from Fq must be uploaded. Furthermore, by the definition of CSA
increment, there are a total of L = µℓ independent symbols from Fq uploaded for each of the
servers. However, according to the definition of CSA null-shaper, for all n ∈ F , u ∈ [µ], we have
Ωn,u = 0. Therefore, it is not necessary to upload the CSA increment for the servers n, n ∈ F . In
other words, the storage for the servers n, n ∈ F is not changed in the update phase. Therefore,
we have U = ((N −X +X∆ + T )µℓ+NℓK) /(µℓ) = (N −X +X∆ + T ) +NℓK/L. On the other
hand, the user downloads a total ofNµ symbols from the finite field Fq in the retrieval phase, thus
we have D = (Nµ)/(µℓ) = N/ℓ. The asymptotic setting follows by applying the limit L/K →∞.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 1. (Symmetrization and Randomization) As described, the upload cost is not symmetric across
servers, because the CSA increment is not uploaded to the servers n, n ∈ F . However, we claim that
symmetry can be achieved by randomizing over the N permutations of the servers that correspond to cyclic
shifts. The choice of the set F can be any subset of [N ] such that |F| = X − (X∆ + T ). Therefore, it is
possible for each user to uniformly and randomly select the set F from the cyclic permutations to achieve a
symmetric upload cost in the average sense.
4.1 Complexity Analysis
To further analyze the CSA-RW scheme, we conduct a brief complexity analysis in this subsection.
(Encoding and Decoding Complexity) First, let us consider the complexity of the encoding and
decoding algorithms of our construction. It is worth noting that the computations for producing
the CSA storage, CSA query and CSA increment can be regarded as multiplications of (scaled)
Cauchy-Vandermonde matrices with various vectors. The computation for recovering the desired
submodel by the user from the answers of the N servers can be viewed as solving linear systems
defined by Cauchy-Vandermonde matrices. Cauchy-Vandermonde matrices are one important
class of structured matrix, for which superfast algorithms have been studied extensively [52, 53].
Therefore, by these superfast algorithms, the complexity of producing the CSA storage, CSA query
and CSA increment is at most O˜(µℓKN log2N), O˜(ℓKN log2N) and O˜(µℓN log2N), respectively.
On the other hand, the complexity of decoding the desired submodel from the answers of the
servers is at most O˜(µN log2N) = O˜(µℓ log2N). It is obvious that the encoding/decoding algo-
rithms have a complexity that is almost linear in their output/input sizes.
(Access Complexity) Another complexity of interest is the access complexity. It is clear from
the CSA-RW scheme that in the retrieval phase, the access complexity for each of the servers is
O(KL), i.e., all of the K submodels must be read. On the other hand, in the update phase, for
each of the servers, a symmetrized (or randomized, see Remark 1) CSA-RW scheme has (average)
access complexity of O
(
N−X+X∆+T
N KL
)
, i.e., (in the average sense) it is sufficient to update only
1− X−(X∆+T )N fraction of the symbols of each of theK submodels.
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5 Conclusion
Weexplored the problem ofX-secure T -private federated submodel learning from an information-
theoretic perspective. We proposed a novel construction of a cross-subspace alignment based pri-
vate read and write scheme, the CSA-RW scheme. The CSA-RW scheme settles an open question
by taking advantage of synergistic gains from the joint design of read and write operations. CSA-
RW improves upon baseline schemes available from prior works; it is shown to be order-wise
optimal in terms of the upload cost and asymptotically optimal in terms of download cost when
X ≥ X∆ + T . Note that the baseline schemes [10, 49] have relaxed recoverability constraints,
i.e., they may require access to more than X + 1 servers in order to recover all the stored model
data. On the other hand, the CSA-RW scheme presented in this work provides more efficient re-
coverability, i.e., access to any X + 1 servers is enough to recover all stored data. Even with the
burden of this additional constraint, CSA-RW still improves upon the baselines. Conversely, a
relaxed recoverability constraint may allow CSA-RW to use other storage formats such as MDS-
codedX-secure storage [25], which have the potential to reveal richer trade-offs between storage,
recoverability, and communication costs for given security and privacy levels. This is a promising
direction for future work. Another interesting question for future work has to do with the degree
of submodel partitioning. Partitioning the model into a greater number of smaller submodels
(increasing K , decreasing L) has the potential to improve communication costs by making the
training more localized, but also carries the risk of increasing communication cost because multi-
ple smaller submodels may need to be trained by each user. This direction leads to multi-message
private read [39] and write operations, which are also of fundamental interest.
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